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210 [51 C.2d 
A. No. 2i)048. In Bank. :\ov. 
ELLA S. LAIHD, Respondent, v. 'I'. \V. JI.!IA'l'HEH, INC. 
Corporation), Appellant. 
[1] Negligence-Duty Towa-rds Business Invitees.-A Rtorc owmer 
owes to business invitee the duty to excmoise ordinary care 
to keep its premises in a re~sonahly safe condition or to 
wa of latent or concealed dangers of which it knows or 
should know in the exereise of reasonable care. 
[2] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Ordinary Care.--~ What con-
stitutes "ordinary eare" under the facts is usually a question 
for the jury, which must view the conduct ns a whole in the 
light of the circumstances. 
[3] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Exercise of Care.-In the 
absence of legislatively or judicially declared standards, 
whether or not the conduct of a party conformed to that of a 
"reasonably prudent man," the standard usually applied, is a 
question left to the jury's detPrmination when different con-
clusions may rensorwbly be drawn from the evidoncP. 
[4] !d.-Questions of Law and Fact-Negligence of Defendant: 
Evidence-Sufficieney.-In an action for injuries sustained by 
a 79-year-old department store patron who fell on the bottom 
step of a stairway leading to the basement of the store, 
whether defendant failed to keep its premises in a reasonably 
safe condition was properly left to the jury, and the jury 
could reasonably conclude that by ending a handrail, which 
started at the top of the stairway, short of the bottom step, 
defendant created an unreasonable risk of danger on the 
grounds that it could rPasonably have been foreseen that the 
customers, a large number of whom were elderly persons, 
would assume that the handrail would continue the full length 
of the stnirway, that their attention would be distracted by the 
display of wnres oi"fered for snle in the basement, that they 
~would be preoccupied with the possibility of making purchases, 
aiHl that they would rely on the handrail to help them safely 
to the basement. 
't 1] 8Pe Cal.Jur.2d, Negligence, § 108 et seq.; Am.Jur., 1'\egli-
; <·: •· ·, ~j 131 et seq. 
I\L•K. Dig. References: ~ 76; [2, :J] 1\egligcnce, 
6] 1\ cglig·enee, ~ l4; [7] 
:-<,•gligellcP, 3147; Neglig('llet', §-13; [D, 10] \Vibwsses, §136; 
[11] Evidence, ~~ liJG(3), 1iJG ; [12] EvidPmc, ~ 1;')()('1); [13] 
l•;vidPIJCP, ~ 90; Negligence, § 191; N cgligence, § 209; 
[1GJ 1\egligen<:e, § :2q(i, 
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[5] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Excuses for Failure to Avoid 
Injury. -In nn aetion for sustained by a 79-year-old 
store patron who fell on the bottom step of a 
stairway !earling to the basement of the ston', it does not 
necessarily follow from the fact that plaintiff mi~;·ht have seen 
the last step had she looked that she was contrihutinlly neg-li-
g-ent as watter of la\Y; all of the circumstances must he taken 
iuto account, 11nd where there is some reasonable excuse for 
failure to observe an obvious the conduct may be 
exeused. 
[6] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Excuses for Failure to Avoid 
Injm:y.-Althongh a person may be charged, as a matter of 
law, with that there are pitfalls to be avoided on a 
public it is not necessarily neg-ligent to fail to watch 
for :t businc>ss cstahlishmPnt when the ordinarily 
prudent pPrson would not in fact expect the condition where 
it is, or where he is likely to have his attention distracted 
us he approaches it. 
[7] !d.-Evidence-Contributory Negligence.--In an action for 
injuries sustained by a 79-year-old department store patron 
who fell ou the bottom step of a stairway leading to the base-
ment of the store, it could not be said as a matter of law that 
pluintifr did not usc the degree of care that should have been 
exercised by a reasonably prudent person under similar cir-
cumstances where the jury could reasonably conclude that 
plaintiff could safely assume that a handrail, which started at 
the top of the stairway, would not terminate before the bottom 
of the stairway was reached. 
[8] !d.-Contributory Negligence-Care in Discovery and Avoid-
ance of Danger.--Contributory negligence is not imputable to 
a plaintiff for ftliling to look out for a danger which he had 
no reasonable cause to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who was 
deceived by appeanmces calculated to deceive an ordinarily 
prudent person. 
[9] Witnesses-Cross-examination-Matters Bearing on Credibil-
ity.--Although the cross-examination of a witness should ordi-
narily be confined to matters that have been testified to by the 
~witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to test 
accuracy or credibility, and the trial court is gi \'Cn a wide 
discretion in eontrolling cross-examination affecting the knowl-
edge and credibility of an expert witness. 
[5] See Cal.Jur.2d, Xegligcnce, §§ 210,220 et seq.; Am.Jur., Neg-
ligence, § 17 4 ct seq~ 
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[14] Negligence-Instructions-Exercise of Care-Presumptions.-
of due care may 
under certain circumstances, an instruction 
on the should not be given when the party who 
seeks to invoke it testifies his conduct immediately 
to or at the time in question. 
[15] Id.- Instructions- Contributory Negligence- Exercise of 
Care-Presumptions.-In an action for injuries sustained by 
a store patron who fell on the bottom 
step of a leading to the basement of the store, where 
testified to her conduct immediately prior to or at the 
time of her fall, there was no room for any presumption of 
Nov.l958] LAmD v. T. W. MATHER, INc. 
[51 C.2d 210; 331 P.2d 617] 
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due care, and it was error to instruct the on such pre-
[16] Id.- Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions-Contributory 
Negligence.-In an action for injuries su~tained a 
old store patron who fell on the bottom 
to the basement of the 
time of her 
sented the jury eould 
either wny on the vital issue 
gence, the of the instruction added 
tiff's contention that she was with due care for her own 
and thus overemphasiL~cd her claim in the minds of the 
and dPfendant was thereby forced to overcome a 
preponderance of evidence, not ease that she 
was :free from eontrilmtory 
tion that she was acting with due care. 
APPEAL from a j ndgment of the Superior Court of I.~os 
Angeles County and from au order denying motion for 
ment notwithstanding the verdict. John Gee Clark, Judge. 
Heversed. 
Action for damages for injuries sustained by patron of 
store as resnlt of fall on bottom step of stairway leading to 
basement of store. J udgnH'nt for plaintiff reversed. 
Moss, Lyon & Dnnn, 
for Appellant. 
A. Moss and Henry F. ·walker 
Adams, Duque & Hazeltine and James S. Cline for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-While descending the 
ment of defendant's store, plaintiff, a 
·whose health and ·were fell 
aud suffered a broken hip. 
taken from the basement 
on next ) shows t lw st 
the aecident exeept that in 
was a rail on eaeh side of lhe stainrdl the 
the hraekets appear. 'l'he handrail tcl'minated 
a and a halt' sbort of ilw fnll tlw 
this action for testified that sl1c nscd 
handrail for support, that wllcn ''he reac-hed the rnd of the 
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handrail she assumed that she had reached the bottom of the 
stairs, and that she then stepped forward and fell. At the 
trial, which was held four years after the accident, she testi-
fied at olle time that she could not remember where she was 
looking when she fell and at another time that she was look-
ing out into the lighted basement. Wares were on display in 
the basement in front of the stairs. Plaintiff testified that 
she did not recall looking at any particular display, but de-
fendant's traffic manager testified that after the accident 
pla iutiff st at<•d 
r·handise in [ront of ih(• stainn1y. 'fherc was 
least fJO per eent of the eustomer-s visit 
department store ·were over 65-70 years oi age, 
ant had notiee of the eom1ition of the , and that ex-
tensions for the haudra il had lJeen ordered but had not lJeell 
installed the time of tb" aceident. Two witHesse:s testified 
for defendant that the stainnty did not Yiolate the Pasadena 
Buildi11g Code and that it was collstrncted according to 
''standard ellgineering praetiee.'' 
'rhe jury returned a verdict in fayor of plai11tiff for 
$9,:'540.18. Motions for a direeted verdiet, judgment notwith-
standing the verdict, and for a new trial were denied. De-
fendant appeals from the judgment entered on the Yerdict 
and from the order denying its motion for jndg·mcnt notwith-
standing the verdiet, elaiming that the evidence was insuffi-
cient to establish liability and that certain rul ing·s on 
admission of eYidence and insiructiom; to the jury were preju-
dicially erroneous. 
I. Sufficiency of the EL'idcncc to Support the Verdict 
[1] It is coneeded that the plaintiff \Yas a business invitee 
at the time of the accident. Defendant >ras therefore obliged 
to exercise ordinary eare to keep its premises in a reasonably 
safe eonditiou or to give warning of latent or toneealecl 
dangers of wl1ieh it knew or should have known in the exercise 
of reasonable care. (Blumberg v. JJI. cCc 'T. Inc., 34 CaL2d 226, 
229 [20D P.2c1 1]; Blodgett v. B. II. Dyas. 4 CaL2cl 511, 512 
[50 P .2d 801 J ; see 2 Rest., 'forts, § 34B.) Defendant contends 
that its motion for jndgmcnt notwithstanding the verdict 
should have been granted 011 the grounds that the cvidenee 
discloses as a matter of law that it exrn:ised the required 
degree of care in the maintenanee of its prrmif>es and tllat the 
plaintiff failed to exereise ordinary eare for her own safety. 
[2] ·what constitutes "ordinary eare" under the faet.s 
of any particular ease is usually a question for the jury, whieh 
must view the conduet as a whole in the light of all the cir-
cumstances. (3] Thus, it is common practice for the jury 
to determine the standard of conduct to be applied within 
the compass of the broad rule that the preseribed conduet 
must conform to that of a ''reasonably prndent man under 
the circumstances." (See Peri v. Los Angeles Junction Ry. 
Co., 22 CaL2d lll, 120-121 1137 P.2d 441]; Clinkscales v. 
Can;cr, 22 CaL2d 72, 75-76 [136 P.2d 777].) In the absence 
dc·ter;Jl i11atiOJl 
whether or not 
a safe 
Defendant's ens-
persons. The jury 
conelude that by ending the handrail short 
of the stairway, defendant created an un-
reasonable risk of danger, on the grounds that it could 
haYe been foreseen that the customers would as-
the handrail would continue the full of the 
that their attc>ntion would be distraeted by the 
of wares offered for sale in the that they 
would be with the possibility of making pur-
1 and that they vvould rely on the handrail to help 
to the basement. 
Defendant cites several decisions for the proposition that 
it is not liable as a matter of law. In Holmes v. Mocsser, 120 
Cal.App.2d 612 P.2d 27], the plaintiff fell on stairs that 
did not have a handrail even though a statute re-quired that 
one be In affirming a of nonsuit, the 
court held that the absence of a handrail is not ac.tionable 
1 'l'he trial court instruded the jury that: "Yon may consider the 
fact that the attention of who visit public stores ordinarily is 
attraeterl the dispby wares offered for sale ;md may he more or 
less by the transaction which have in mind. You may 
c-onsider whether the doferrdant that fact with ordinary 
care in the exercise of the which defined; also whether the 
plaintifr dicl or did not shaTe ort1inary experience of store visitors, 
anrl if so, "What effcet that faet had upon her conduct in relation to 
the cause the aeeldcnt." Defendant contends tbnt it was 
error to so instruct on the ground that the is 
unsupported the The eont~ntion is without merit. 
testify that eould not Tecall thnt her atten-
been distracted partieular thPro was evidence 
direet]y in of the stair1vay; 
she >Vns looking ont into the lighted 
tho defendant's traffic testified that plaintiff 
before she fell at the merchandise 
out in tho open in front of stairwell." 'l'hc thnt there was 
merchandise on display in the of the stairwell is relevant 
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to basements of 
mere an tile 'rherc JS no duty to give any 
of the presence of a stairway and 
eyes to proir<et thrmsclycs from such 
(Cit:cttions.)" Cal.2d at pp. 512-513.) 
Def,·JH1ant vcmtends that in the plaintiff 
l1aYc herself ' hPr 
not follow from the fact that plaintiff 
lookrd that she was 
All of the cir-
and where there is 
to observe an obvious 
.Althongh a person 
of law, with the knowledge that 
avoided on a pnblic it is not 
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necessarily negligent to fail to watch for dangers in a business 
establishment wl1en the ordinarily prudent person would not 
in fact expect to find the condition where it is, or where he is 
likely to have his attention distracted as he approaches it. 
(See Harper & James, The Law of 'l'orts 1491-1493; Prosser, 
Torts, 2d ed., 459-460.) Tlwre arc many cases involving acci-
dents in mercantile establishments where the question of 
plaintiff's contributory negligence has been held to be a 
question for the jury even though the plaintiff failed to 
observe what may have been an obvious danger. For example, 
in Walsh v. JJ[auricc Mercantile Co., 20 Cal.App.2d 45 [66 
P.2d 181], the plaintiff tripped and fell over a seale that pro-
truded into the aisle of defendant's store. The court stated: 
''Conceding that if the plaintiff had looked she might have 
seen the scale, nevertheless in the circumstances she was rea-
sonably justified in assuming that the aisle was unobstructed, 
and her failure to see it was not necessarily negligence. Differ-
ent inferences might be drawn from the evidence ... the ques-
tion was one for the jury." (See also Blumberg v. M. & T. 
Inc., 34 Cal.2d 226 [209 P.2d 1] [clearly visible opening in rug 
mat]; Nccl v. Mannings, Inc., 19 Cal.2d 647 [122 P.2d 576] 
[projection extending over the end of a stairway] ; Ratt v. 
Redwood City Woman's Clnb, 111 Cal.App.2d 546 [245 P.2d 
12] [worn and slippery stairs]; Locke v. Red River Lbr. Co., 
65 Cal.App.2d 322 [150 P.2d 506] [plainly visible crack in 
concrete floor].) [7] In the present ease we cannot say 
that as a matter of law plaintiff did not use the degree of 
care that should have been exercised by a reasonably prudent 
person under similar eireumstanecs. 'l'he jury could reason-
ably conclude that plaintiff could safely assume that the hand-
rail would not terminate before the bottom of the stairway 
was reached. [8] ''Contributory negligence is not imputa-
ble to a plaintiff for failing to look out for a danger which 
he had no reasonable eanse to apprehend, or to a plaintiff who 
was deceiYCd by appearances calculated to deceive an ordinar-
ily prudent person." (Brandenbtu·g v. Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co., 28 Cal.2d 282, 287 [169 P.2d 909].) There was therefore 
no error in denying the motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict. 
II. Scope of Ct·oss-Examination of Defendant's 
Expert Witness 
Thomas C. Shields, a construction engineer presented by 
defendant as an expert witness, testified on direct examination 
that in his opinion the stairway conformed to ''standard 
Nov. 
engineering practiee" in the city of Pasadena. On cross-
examination plaintiff's counsel asked whether he limited his 
answers to standard engineering practice in Pasadena, to 
which the witness replied "No," volunteering that: "That 
would also be [true] anywhere in the world, so far as I am 
concerned." The witness was then asked, over objection, 
whether the stairway would conform to proper practice in 
''all of Los Angeles,'' to which he replied, ''Yes.'' On further 
cross-examination counsel interrogated him on his familiarity 
with the Los Angeles Building Code and the witness read 
from the code certain provisions dealing with the require-
ment of handrails. Defendant contends that facts concerning 
the building code were irrelevant to the present inquiry, that 
they were not brought out on direct examination, and that it 
was therefore improper to permit this course of cross-exami-
nation. Plaintiff contends that when the witness voluntarily 
stated that in his expert opinion the stairway conformed to 
standard engineering practice "everywhere in the world" in-
cluding Los Angeles, plaintiff could test his credibility by 
showing that this statement could not possibly be true. 
[9] Although the cross-examination of a witness should 
ordinarily be confined to matters that have been testified to by 
the witness on direct examination, latitude is permitted to 
test accuracy or credibility (Newman v. Los Angeles Tr·ansit 
Lines, 120 Cal.App.2d 685, 691 [262 P.2d 95]; Wigmore, 
Evidence, § 1006; McCormick, Evidence, § 22), and the trial 
court is given a wide discretion in coutrolling cross-examina-
tion affecting the knowledge and credibility of an expert 
witness. (Laguna Salada, etc. School Dist. v. Pacific Develop-
ment Co., 119 Cal.App.2d 470 [259 P.2d 498].) [10] In 
the present case defendant's witness offered his expert opinion 
as to the safe construction of the stairway ''anywhere in the 
world." rrhe trial court did not err in permitting the plaintiff 
to inquire into the basis for this opinion nor to counter the 
effect of the witness's broad statement by attempting to show 
that it was not correct. ( Cf. People v. W estelc, 31 Cal.2d 
469,476 [190 P.2d 9] .) 
III. Admissibility of Evidence of Previous Injuries 
Over objection by defendant, George Falk, a former em-
ployee of defendant, was permitted to testify that before the 
accident he had told Mr. Kalik, defendant's vice-president, 
that: ''we should do something about that rail because I had 
heard from one of the employees-! don't remember who it 
fore relevant and llot to show that 
fell, but to show defendant's of 
condition of the stairway. Insofar as 
17 Cal.App.2d 401 P.2d , 
the principle that it is proper to admit 
injuries that reasonably tends to show that the 
knew or should have known of the 
tion that caused the injury in 2 
2 In that case the court upheld a ruling sustaining the objection to 










Southern Pacific R.R. Co., 
; N uuncmakcr v. 
; Swanson v. Bogatin, 149 
8] ; v. & County 
419 [322 P.2d 623] .) 
testified to her conduct 
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accident occurred. 
the fact that 
to tll() 
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[16] The question remains whether the error was prej-
udicial. In Bntigan v. Yellow Cab Co., 49 Cal.2d 652, 660-
661 [~l20 P.2d 500], it is stated that: 
'''!'he determination ·whether, in a specific instance, the 
probable cf'fed of the instruction has been to mislead the jury, 
and \vhrther the error· has been prejudicial so all to require 
reversal deprndR on ali the circumstances of the case, includ-
ing the evidencE', and the other instructions given. No pre-
eiRe formula can be drawn.'' 
In that ease, the giving of an instruction on unavoidable 
accident 1vas held to constitute reversible error because it 
tended to overemphasize d0fendant's case. From the evidence 
presented in the present case the jury could reasollably have 
drawu the infcrenc0 either way on the vital issue of plaintiff's 
eontributory negligener. 'l'he giving of the instruction ob-
viousl.v added strength to the plaintiff's contention that she 
was acting \Yith due care for her own safety, and thus over-
emphasized her claim in the minds of the jury. The de-
fendant was thereby forcrd to overcome hy a preponderance 
of the eyidenec, not only plaintiff's case that she was free from 
eoni.rihutory negligence•, but also the presumption that she 
was ading ·with due care. Instructions like the one here in-
volved Jlec:essitated rcvc~rsal in the similar cases of Rozzen v. 
B7allienfc7d. 117 C'aL\.pp.2c1 285 r255 P.2d 8501; Yc1·lwcgcn 
Y. Ouy P. j ikinson Co., 12G Cal.App.2d 442 1272 P.2d 85f5] ; 
and Stout Y. Southern Pacific R. R. Oo., 127 Cal.App.2d 491 
r:nJ 1'.2(! ]!J-f], 011 tlw g'l'01llld that ihe ('!'l'OllCOUS instrnc•tion 
may haYr tipped the seal0 in plaintiff's J'avo1· in the delibera-
tions of' the jne,\', It \vas therefore prejmlir:ial error to give 
the in:struetim1. 
The judgment is reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., and McComb, J., 
concurred. 
SHENK, ,J., Dissenting.-'l'he question of fact with refer-
ence to the negligenee of the defendant and the contributory 
ncgligenee of the plaintiff were well within the province of the 
jury to determine in this ease. They were both decided in 
favor of the plaintiff. Whether it was error to give an in-
struction based on the presumption provid<'d for in sub-
division 4 of seetion 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure 
and if so \Yhether it "·as reversible error under the doctrine 
of Mar Slue Y. Jfary7and Assurance Corp., 190 Cal. 1 [210 
Nov.1958] I;AIRD u. T. w. MATHER, INC. 
f51 C.2d 2!0; 331 P.2d 6171 
220 
P. 269], were adequately considered by the Di;.;trict Court or 
Appeal of the Seeond Distriet, Division 1, in an opinion 
writtPn by .Tm;tiee I,illie ( 324 P.2d 301). The presumption 
is '' i hat a pcrRon tak0R ordinary earc of his own eonecrns. '' 
'!'he Mar Shee ease plaees certain limitations, whieh need 
not here be discussed, on the applieation of that presump-
tion. 'l'he Distriet Court of: Appeal held that, because of the 
incomplete and uncertain testimony of the 83-ycar-old plaintiff 
taken some four years after the accident, the limitations of 
the Mar Shee case did not apply. It was also held that, con-
sidering the evidence and the instructions as a whole, there 
was no reversible error. "With this I agree, and adopt the 
opinion of the District Court of Appeal as what I believe to be 
a just and proper disposition of the appeal. I would affirm the 
judgment. 
CAR'l'ER, J., Dissenting.-! concur in the views ex-
pressed in the dissenting opinion of JVI:r. Justice Shenk but 
feel that the problem involved deserves further discussion. 
Even assuming that instructing the jury on the presump-
tion of due care was error in this case, it was clearly not 
prejudicial. 
The challenged instrudion reads: "At the outset of this 
trial, each party was entitled to the presumption of law that 
every person takes ordinary care of his own concerns and that 
he obeys the law. These presumptions are a form of prima 
facie evidence and will support findings in accordance there-
with, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. "'When there 
is other evidence that conflicts with such a presumption, it 
is the jury's duty to weigh that evidence against the presnmp-
tion and any evidence that may support the presumption, to 
determine which, if either, preponderates. Such deliberations, 
of course, shall be related to, and in accordance with, my 
instructions on the burden of proof." (Emphasis added.) 
The majority holds that this instruction resulted in prej-
udice to defendant on the ground that since the evidence on 
the issue of plaintiff's contributory negligence is susceptible 
to an inference either way, the presumption has the effect of 
"overemphasizing" plaintiff's case in the minds of the jury, 
and thus it might have tipped the scales in plaintiff's favor. 
To support its position that overemphasis is a ground for re-
versable error the majority relies on Butigan v. Yellow Cab 
Co .. , 49 Ca1.2d 652 [320 P.2d 500). It is submitted that this de-
cision will not support this interpretation. 
(St'l' 
:2<1 [:29D P.2d .) 
that 1he j ary 
iJJilneneecl one mu:-,t con'iidnt· the 
of 
!.ion is a 1so di t·eeted to 
or the 
with due eat'('. Ho'.\'('Y''r. i 





that tlle presnmpt ioH 
's rlctermi ion 
Since it call he inferred that U1c did not consider the 
presumption of due care in fayor of defem1ant when COJJsider-
ing the of defendant it lllll'Nl:<Onable 
to assnmc that the jury aded any in its notion 
or the presumption when of 
tiff: 's contributory 
on tl1is issue \Yas, as on the issue of 
rium. Oue is to conclude, oH the tlwt a 
jury ·will prohab1y aet in the same case, that the 
prcsum ption played little or no JHlrt in thr determina-
tion of plaintiii''s eontribntory neg1igeme. 
Unless this court is prepared to say without any affirmative 
showing, and eoHtrary io reasonable that the jury 
probably acted im~onsistent1y, it is difficult to perceive, based 
on the eyidence herein, precisely how tho of due 
care affected the result, so that without the the 
result would han' he en a He red. Indeed, where the reasona blc 
inferenec is that the jm~· has little m· no f.ffeet to an 
erroneous instruction in considering the question of negli-
gence, and i.l1eir subsequent cletermillation o[ the que~tion of 
coHtributory nrgligence is consistent with this in-
ference, a proper c:ondusion i:; that the instruction did not 
result in prejudice. 
It is obYious that as requisites to such a conclusion the re-
viewing court must determine the state of the evidence on 
the issues of negligcJJee and contributory as well 
as ascertain how the jury utilized the presumption iu regard 
to defendant's negligence. 
For example, defendant from a judgment for plain-
tiff:, contending that it was prejudicial el'roe to instruct the 
jury ou the presumption ol:' due care. 'l'he reviewing eourt 
determines that the state of the eYidence on the issue of negli-
gence was in near equilibrium but on the issue of eontributory 
110gligence it was clear and eonviueing. Examining the jury's 
51 C.2d-8 
due earc Rinec on evidence in llear f:(J 
had to carry the burden of overcome the preRump-
tion in defendant's favor, which worke(1 to defendant's ad-
vantage in this instance. However, on the con-
the rc1ied 
since this could 
in the face 
eonvineing evidence to contrary. It may be 
inferred, that the aetious in 
sumption ·were inconsistent and resulted in 
'l'hus, it is the affirmative of the ineonsist-
ency that establishes prejudice when defendant 
\Vithout such a showing there is no reason to bc1ieYc the error 
was probably prejudicial. 
In cases where plaintiff appeals from a for de-
fendant on the ground that prejudicial error resulted from 
instructing the jury on the presumption of due care, it is 
impossible to tell how the jury utilized the The 
jury might have found the defendant 
plaintiff contributiYely negligent.. ·under these conditions 
error is usually found on the ground that the instructions 
tended to confuse or mislead the jury. (See Rozzcn v. 
Blumenfeld, 117 Cal.App.2d 285 [255 P.2d 850]; Slant v. 
Smdhern Pacific R. R. Co., 127 4Dl P.2d 
194] .) ]'or this reason the cases cited the majority for 
the proposition that instrm~ting the on the presumption 
or due care constitutes prejudicial error are not in In 
Ro.zzcn v. Blumenfeld, supra, 117 
v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., supra, 127 
plaintiff was appealing from a judgment for defendant. The 
jury could have found for defendant on the alternative 
grmwfis of nonnegligenee or plaintiff's negli-
gence. 'rhus, it is impossible to draw any inferrnce from the 
jury's determination of thr vital issues since \Ye cannot be 
('C"r-tain on whieh ground the jnry found for dPfendant. 
The case of Verlwegen v. GttJJ Ji' .1.ttli:inson 126 Cal.App. 
2d 442 [272 P.2d 855], involved an defendant after 
a judgment for plaintiff. An attack on the instruction con-
taining the presumption of due care was upheld. The case is 
distinguishable on the ground that there, was predi-
cated, not on the presumption of due care alone, hut was the 
net result of a series of erroneous instructions, of which the 
LAIRD v. T. \V. MATHER, INc. 
[51 C.2d 210; 331 P.2d 6171 
227 
oE due care 
It sllould 
before held the 
erroneous made the pre-
applicable to both plaintiff and 
wr>.-T'nv of note that this court has 
of such an instruction to be 
any circumstances. However, the 
have ruled both \Yays on the sub-
instrnetion on the of due care identical 
~111d fonnd not to be prejndieial 
17 Cal.Apn.2d 176, J79 IG1 P.2d 
; Sil'oh v. Cal.App.2d 241, 244-2,15 P.2d 
228 I.JAIRD v. T. w. MATHER, INC. [51 C.2d 
v. Som·es, supra, 17 Cal. 
cases appear to have discarded 
it ·with the rule that whether such 
instruction is depends upon the facts of the par-
ticular ease. 'l'his ad hoc method of deciding prejudice paved 
the way for the theory adopted by the majority here. (See 
Farcl Transportation Ca., 101 Cal.App.2d 548, 
997]; Razzen v. Blnmenfcld, supm, 117 Cal. 
at 288; Stout v. Southern Pacific R. R. Ca., supm, 
127 at 497-498; l{unncmakcr v. IIcadlce, supra, 
140 Cal.App.2d at 676.) I would disapprove the last cited 
cases and hold the instruction here not prejudicial. 
For the reasons it seems clear that no prejudice 
resulted to defendant here and the judgment should be af-
firmed. 
